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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the causality between income inequality and crime in Malaysia for the 
period 1973-2003. Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure is 
employed to (1) analyze the impact of income inequality on various categories of criminal 
activities as well as to (2) analyze the impact of various categories of criminal activities on 
income inequality. Interestingly our results indicate that income inequality has no meaningful 
relationship with any of the various categories of crime selected, such as total crime, violent 
crime, property crime, theft and burglary. Crime exhibits neither long-run nor short run 
relationships with income inequality and they are not cointegrated. It cannot be denied that 
there is ambiguity in the empirical studies of crime economics regarding various income 
variables leading to often mixed and contradicting results, which might be a good explanation 
of this finding. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Crime or more specifically criminal and violent behavior has become a major concern in 
recent years across the world and have gained considerable popularity in term of the number 
of researches being conducted and results being debated. Crime rates vary enormously across 
countries and regions. Recently there have been more and more studies, quantitative studies 
in comparative criminology to investigate the effects of societal development on crime trends 
and types of crime. Arguably, crime literature originally proposed by Becker (1968) and 
Ehrlich (1973) have been considered as the most important seminal work in rejuvenating the 
interest in crime studies. Norms that promote fairness such as equity and equality are 
sometimes considered to be closely related to level of criminal activities. Many economists 
agree that rising inequality makes problems like poverty and crime more intractable and 
undermines the political base of democratic capitalism. 
 
According to Chisholm and Choe (2005) there is ambiguity in the empirical studies of crime 
economics regarding various income variables used to proxy the expected net gains from 
crime and as a result empirical findings are often mixed or contradictory to one another. The 
possible explanations for cross country differences are many, ranging from distinct 
definitions of crimes and different reporting rates (percentage of the total number of crimes 
actually reported to the police), to real differences in the incidence of crime and even to 
different cultural aspects. No matter how we look at it, it is still an utmost important subject 
due to its large impact on a psychological aspect as well as economical aspect. Its pernicious 
effects on economic activities and more generally on the quality of life of people contribute 
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to the emerging fact that crime is merging as a priority in policy agendas worldwide. Due to 
the complexity of the phenomenon and lack of consensus among policy makers or scholars, 
research on this issue continues to be conducted in many areas. 
 
The impact of crime on an economy can be segregated into, primarily the prevention cost, 
and secondarily the correctional cost and the lost opportunity of labor being held in 
correctional facility. Costs acquainted with crime preventions, such as private investment for 
crime prevention gadgets such as anti theft or anti burglary equipments, or government 
expenditures such as campaigns and education on safe society and police personnel 
expenditure. The correctional cost refers to cost such as correction facilities cost and prison 
personnel, while the lost opportunity refers to the lost of potential labor contribution due to 
being in correction facilities. Crime results not only in the loss of property, lives and misery, 
they also cause severe mental anguish. Imrohoroglu et al. (2006) mentioned that according to 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice and Justice Research Institute, people 
victimized by property crime (as a % of the total population) varied between 14.8% in New 
Zealand to 12.7% in Italy, 12.2% in U.K., 10.0% in U.S., and 3.4% in Japan. 
 
Madden and Chiu (1998) mentioned that it seems reasonable to expect that the level of 
property crime will be influenced in some way by the distribution of income (and wealth) 
while  Teles (2004) reiterated that monetary and fiscal policies have impacts on crime. More 
analysis are being done recently linking income inequality to crime such as Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002a, 2002b), Chisholm and Choe (2005), Imrohoroglu et al. (2006), Choe (2008), Lorenzo 
and Sandra (2008), Magnus and Matz (2008), to name a few. 
 
However not many papers was written on the subject of crime in Malaysia, except by Sidhu 
(2005) which was a descriptive research on the trends of crime in Malaysia, and also by 
Habibullah and Law (2007) on the relationship between crime and financial economic 
variables. It cannot be argued that crime is an utmost important subject of study; the fact that 
the  nation and public griped with fear due to the rising statistics of criminal activities and 
media, both electronic and print, highlighting it on a daily basis. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some prior evidence on the 
effect of macroeconomic variables especially income inequality on criminal activity. In 
section 3, we present the unit root, cointegration and Granger causality tests in the ARDL 
bounds testing framework used in the study. In section 4, we discuss the empirical results and 
the last section contains our conclusion. 
 
II. A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
As explained in the early part of this paper, it cannot be denied that the seminal paper by 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) have been considered as the most important work in 
rejuvenating the interest in crime studies. While Becker (1968) emphasizes on the cost and 
benefit of crime, Ehrlich (1973) extends Becker’s crime model by including the role of 
opportunity cost between illegal and legal work. Madden and Chiu (1998), Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002a) and Choe (2008) discussed about the relationship between income inequality and 
crime. Madden and Chiu (1998) was more specific, since he only researches about burglary, 
Choe (2008) tested income inequality on various type of crime while Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002b) studied about the causes of violent crime. 
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Madden and Chiu (1998) presented a theoretical model which traces a potential link between 
worsening income inequality and increases in the number of burglaries, and his most 
powerful result (Theorem 3) says simply that increases in relative differential inequality 
increase the level of crime.  Fajnzylber et al. (2002b) strongly reported that increases in 
income inequality raise crime rates (violent crime), in their study on several developed and 
developing countries for the period 1970-1994. The same kind of result was also obtained for 
Mexico in a study by Lorenzo and Sandra (2008) whereby they found that wage inequality 
has an important impact on crime. Another study which shares the similar result is a study by 
Nilsson (2004) on Sweden, and found a strong relationship between income inequality and 
crime (robbery/theft).  
 
This is in contrary to the finding of Choe (2008) who could not find any significant 
relationship between crime rates (violent crime and property crime) and income inequality. 
Mehanna (2004) shared the same result, whereby they found that income inequality has no 
important impact on crime in their study for United for the period 1959-2001. Magnus and 
Matz (2008) went a step further whereby they separated the effects of permanent and 
transitory income, diverting from the traditional aggregated measures. They reported that 
while an increase in inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on 
total crimes and property crimes, an increase in inequality in the transitory income and 
traditional aggregated measures yields insignificant effect.   
 
Brush (2007) conduct and compare cross-sectional and time series analyses of United 
States counties, interestingly, the results are in contradiction, income inequality is positively 
associated with crime rates in the cross section analysis, but it is negatively associated with 
crime rates in the time-series analysis. Habibullah and Law (2007) utilized Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) in their study about crime and financial economic variables in 
Malaysia, and generally their result suggests that criminal activity in Malaysia cannot be 
explained properly by real income per capita, financial wealth and interest rate.  
  
III. OVERVIEW OF CRIME RATES IN MALAYSIA 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the crime statistics by various categories of crime selected, such as total 
crime, violent crime, property crime, theft and burglary in Malaysia for the period 1973-2003. 
It can be seen here that the trends are more or less the same across categories showing similar 
upward and downward trend throughout the three decades, peaking at 2000. Figure 2 
illustrates the growth rate of crime by various categories of crime selected, such as total crime, 
violent crime, property crime, theft and burglary in Malaysia for the period 1974 - 2003. 
Again it can be observed that the trends are more or less the same across categories. Figure 3 
illustrates the income inequality in Malaysia for the period (1974 – 2003), and it can be 
observed that income distribution was getting better towards 1980, and then it worsens till 
1986 and back on track to betterment and stabilizes in early 2000. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
Bound testing procedures developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) within an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) framework was chosen due to its main advantage that is the bounds 
test approach is applicable irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are purely I(0), 
purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Apart from that, unrestricted error-correction model 
(UECM) is likely to have better statistical properties than the two-step Engle-Granger method 
because, unlike the Engle-Granger method, the UECM does not push the short –run dynamics 
into the residual term (Banerjee et al, 1998). To implement the bounds testing procedure, we 
estimate the following conditional ARDL unrestricted error-correction model as follows 
 
m
i
n
i
titiitittt INCOMECRIMEINCOMECRIMECRIME
1 0
,4,312110
   (1)
           
m
i
n
i
titiitittt CRIMEINCOMECRIMEINCOMEINCOME
1 0
,4,312110
  (2)
      
Whereby 0  and β0  are constant terms and  and μt are the disturbance terms. When a long- 
run relationship exists the F-test indicates which variable should be normalized (Narayan and 
Narayan, 2005). The null hypothesis for no cointegration among the variables in Eq. (1) is 
( ) denoted by Fcrime (crime|inequality) against the alternative 
( ). Similarly, for Eq. (2) the null hypothesis for no long run meaningful 
relationship among the variables is ( 0: 210H ) as denoted by Finequality 
(inequality|crime) against the alternative ( 0: 211H ). 
 
The asymptotic distribution of critical values is obtained for cases in which all regressors are 
purely I(1) as well as when the regressors are purely I(0) or mutually cointegrated. Because 
the critical value of the test depends on the order of integration of the variables, I(d), where 
, the test utilizes a critical range such that values exceeding the range are evidence 
of rejection, values less than the range are evidence of non-rejection, and values within the 
range are inconclusive. In other words, if the test statistics exceed their respective upper 
critical values (assuming purely I(1) regressors) we can conclude that a long-run relationship 
exists. If the test statistics fall below the lower critical values (assuming the regressors are 
I(0)) we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Inconclusive results achieved 
when the test statistics fall within their respective bounds.  
 
Sources of Data 
 
Data for the income inequality for Malaysia, for the corresponding period was obtained from 
University of Texas, which are estimates of gross household income inequality, computed 
from a regression relationship between the Deininger and Squire inequality measures and the 
UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality measures.  As for the data on various categories of crime for the 
period 1973 to 2003, it was obtained from the Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM). Categories 
selected are total crime, burglary, theft, violent crime and property crime. Throughout the 
analysis, all variables were transformed into natural logarithm. 
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Before testing for cointegration by using the ARDL bounds testing procedure, we test for the 
order of integration for all categories of crime and inequality variables. Table 2 show the 
results of the unit root test for the test of the order of integration of the economic time series 
under investigation. Clearly the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) 
statistics indicate that all categories of crime and income inequality economic series in 
Malaysia are stationary after first differencing ( I(1) ) Table 1 reports the summary statistics 
of all the variable chosen for this study 
 
Having noted that all series are of the same order of integration, that is they are all I(1) 
processes, our relevant critical values are the upper bound of purely I(1) regressors. These 
results are tabulated in Table 3. When the various categories of crime is used as the 
dependent variable, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected in all the cases 
and vice versa, when income inequality is used as the dependent variable, in all cases the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Both these results suggest that there are no 
long-run relationships between income inequality and the crime variable, namely; total crime, 
burglary, violent crime, property crime, theft for the case of Malaysia.  
 
Figure 4 to Figure 8, display the results of the impulse response of the five criminal activities 
chosen with income inequality vice versa, again the results are robust and shows that any 
shocks in the crime variable does not constitutes any shocks to income inequality. On the 
other hand, any shock to income inequality also does not constitute any significant changes to 
crime. we can conclude that the variables does not respond to changes of the other variable  
 
As for variance decomposition, the results shown in  Table 4 to Table 8 are similar to prior 
finding whereby showing the same pattern of results, there are no meaningful relationship 
between these variables (crime and income inequality. In fact percentage changes that 
contributed to the other variable is too small and it stabilizes after a few periods. These 
results are very consistent in nature 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure was 
employed to investigate the long-run relationship between income inequality and various 
categories of crime namely total crime, burglary, violent crime, property crime and theft. A 
bivariate analysis on the impact of income inequality on the five categories of crime 
mentioned earlier, vice versa the impact of the criminal activities chosen on income 
inequality was conducted. The sample period was 1973 – 2003 and the data was annual. All 
the data went through log-log transformation so that the estimates will be less sensitive to 
outliers or influential observations and also in order to reduce the data range. 
  
The results suggest that all the variables chosen are I(1) or in other words they are non-
stationary variables and achieved stationarity only after first differencing. The cointegration 
analysis using the ARDL bounds testing approach clearly indicates that none of the criminal 
activities chosen are cointegrated with income inequality. Though the results are interesting 
and in contradiction to the prior findings of Madden and Chiu (1998), Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002a, 2002b), Lorenzo and Sandra (2008) who all found significant relationship between 
income inequality and crime. It is not surprising because there are a number of studies who 
could not find meaningful relationship between income inequality and crime such as Choe 
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(2008), Mehanna (2004), Magnus and Matz (2008) and Brush (2007).  Although this study 
fails to find any significant relationship between income inequality and various categories of 
crime namely total crime, burglary, violent crime, property crime and theft, it is still an 
important finding. It shows that for the case of Malaysia no causality runs between the 
variables mentioned. From a policy perspective, when initiating crime reduction policies, the 
government should shift from the current “income inequality induces crime” to encompass 
other socioeconomic factors that could be part of broader system of crime causation.  
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Figure 1: Trend of Crime in Malaysia (1973 – 2003) 
Trend of Crime in Malaysia (1973 - 2003)
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Figure 2: Trend of Growth rate of Crime in Malaysia (1973 – 2003) 
Growth rate of Crime in Malaysia (1974 - 2003)
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Figure 3: Trend of Income Inequality in Malaysia (1974 – 2003) 
Income Inequality in Malaysia (1974 - 2003)
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Table 1: Descriptive Analysis 
 
  
INCOME 
INEQUALITY BURGLARY PROPERTY VIOLENT THEFT 
TOTAL 
CRIME 
 Mean 0.40221 124.5621 445.8017 61.2753 321.2396 507.077 
 Median 0.39802 121.1846 451.5979 54.69127 312.9099 510.406 
 Maximum 0.435552 162.6594 651.5103 93.1616 493.2717 744.672 
 Minimum 0.379018 77.25022 304.1563 28.22281 209.7682 354.1379 
 Std. Dev. 0.019489 22.39909 94.29154 17.29077 81.41265 108.2592 
 Skewness 0.350199 -0.035182 0.386013 0.501967 0.605738 0.50474 
 Kurtosis 1.673783 2.045011 2.508635 2.281272 2.51021 2.536053 
              
 Jarque-Bera 2.905484 1.184401 1.081725 1.969086 2.205612 1.594302 
 Probability 0.233928 0.553109 0.582246 0.37361 0.331938 0.450611 
              
 Sum 12.46851 3861.427 13819.85 1899.534 9958.427 15719.39 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 0.011394 15051.58 266726.8 8969.123 198840.6 351601.4 
              
 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 
 
Table 2: Results of ADF unit root test 
 
Crime rate category             Level 
(Intercept and Trend) 
First difference 
(Intercept) 
       
Total Crime  -2.35   3.24**  
Violent Crime  -2.75   3.71***  
Property Crime:  -2.29   -3.19**  
Theft  -2.84   -3.23**  
Burglary  -2.19   -3.21**  
Income Inequality  -1.52   -3.56**  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** and *** denotes significant at 5% and 1% respectively. Based on automatic lag selection (AIC) k = 7 
for all the variables 
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Table 3: Bounds test results for long-run relationship 
Critical value bounds of the F-statistic: intercept and no trend 
 90% level 95% level 99% level 
T I(0)  I(1) I(0)  I(1) I(0)  I(1) 
29 3.303  3.797 4.090  4.663 6.027  6.760 
    
Calculated F-statistic: 
Types of crime  Fcrime 
(crime|inequality) 
Finequality 
(inequality|crime) 
    
Total Crime  3.6625 2.9875 
    
Violent Crime  2.9623 3.6545 
    
Property Crime:  3.5698 2.7894 
    
Theft   3.5766 2.8794 
    
Burglary   3.5144 3.6231 
    
 
Notes: t statistic showing none of them statistically significant even at the 10% level. Critical values are taken from Narayan 
(2005). 
 
Figure 4 Impulse response function between Inequality and Burglary 
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Figure 5 Impulse response function between Inequality and Total Crime 
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Figure 6 Impulse response function between Inequality and Theft 
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LI to LI
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LI to LTH
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LTH to LI
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LTH to LTH
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 12 
Figure 7 Impulse response function between Inequality and Violent Crime 
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Figure 8 Impulse response function between Inequality and Property Crime 
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 Table 4 Variance Decomposition Of Inequality and Violent Crime  
 
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LI:       
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LV:     
 Period S.E. LI LV   Period S.E. LI LV  
                
                
 1  0.019124  100.0000  0.000000  1  0.098142  1.689669  98.31033 
     (0.00000)  (0.00000)      (6.45709)  (6.45709) 
 2  0.030362  99.87055  0.129451  2  0.145609  2.539530  97.46047 
     (2.34707)  (2.34707)      (7.71387)  (7.71387) 
 3  0.037629  99.81030  0.189702  3  0.170787  1.849457  98.15054 
     (4.25950)  (4.25950)      (8.20204)  (8.20204) 
 4  0.042015  99.82024  0.179764  4  0.185614  3.614033  96.38597 
     (5.63628)  (5.63628)      (10.4373)  (10.4373) 
 5  0.044542  99.84004  0.159955  5  0.198459  9.755484  90.24452 
     (6.76396)  (6.76396)      (15.6090)  (15.6090) 
 6  0.045969  99.83169  0.168309  6  0.212103  18.49108  81.50892 
     (7.78857)  (7.78857)      (20.2681)  (20.2681) 
 7  0.046787  99.78947  0.210531  7  0.225823  27.02699  72.97301 
     (8.70534)  (8.70534)      (22.8378)  (22.8378) 
 8  0.047278  99.72653  0.273470  8  0.238183  33.90411  66.09589 
     (9.49334)  (9.49334)      (23.9862)  (23.9862) 
 9  0.047593  99.65937  0.340626  9  0.248347  38.93185  61.06815 
     (10.1297)  (10.1297)      (24.4866)  (24.4866) 
 10  0.047810  99.59936  0.400643  10  0.256194  42.44080  57.55920 
     (10.5984)  (10.5984)      (24.6822)  (24.6822) 
Note : Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions) 
Table 5 Variance Decomposition Of Inequality and Theft 
  
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LI:       
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LTH:     
 Period S.E. LI LTH   Period S.E. LI LTH  
                
                
 1  0.019177  100.0000  0.000000  1  0.091461  1.674753  98.32525 
     (0.00000)  (0.00000)      (5.41495)  (5.41495) 
 2  0.030495  99.98203  0.017971  2  0.146526  3.430165  96.56983 
     (1.47821)  (1.47821)      (8.51508)  (8.51508) 
 3  0.037763  99.97441  0.025591  3  0.178065  2.609666  97.39033 
     (2.95848)  (2.95848)      (10.1306)  (10.1306) 
 4  0.042257  99.97819  0.021812  4  0.195952  3.333270  96.66673 
     (4.58607)  (4.58607)      (10.0582)  (10.0582) 
 5  0.044991  99.97786  0.022144  5  0.210762  9.156809  90.84319 
     (6.53842)  (6.53842)      (11.6626)  (11.6626) 
 6  0.046632  99.96314  0.036862  6  0.227331  19.07895  80.92105 
     (8.56311)  (8.56311)      (15.4658)  (15.4658) 
 7  0.047597  99.93425  0.065753  7  0.245130  29.44671  70.55329 
     (10.3409)  (10.3409)      (18.5250)  (18.5250) 
 8  0.048144  99.89765  0.102345  8  0.261848  37.90182  62.09818 
     (11.6696)  (11.6696)      (20.0988)  (20.0988) 
 9  0.048439  99.86068  0.139324  9  0.275786  43.97006  56.02994 
     (12.5237)  (12.5237)      (20.8628)  (20.8628) 
 10  0.048586  99.82845  0.171551  10  0.286362  48.03036  51.96964 
     (13.0295)  (13.0295)      (21.2578)  (21.2578) 
Note : Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions) 
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Table 6 Variance Decomposition Of Inequality and Total crime 
  
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LI:       
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LTC:     
 Period S.E. LI LTC  Period S.E. LI LTC 
                
                
 1  0.019138  100.0000  0.000000  1  0.085717  1.887642  98.11236 
    (0.00000)  (0.00000)     (4.88368)  (4.88368) 
 2  0.030231  99.99429  0.005713  2  0.134223  3.997877  96.00212 
    (2.67181)  (2.67181)     (8.11754)  (8.11754) 
 3  0.037447  99.93727  0.062726  3  0.159176  3.278697  96.72130 
    (5.50168)  (5.50168)     (9.84848)  (9.84848) 
 4  0.042030  99.78920  0.210797  4  0.171093  3.820781  96.17922 
    (7.80096)  (7.80096)     (10.6663)  (10.6663) 
 5  0.044885  99.55983  0.440171  5  0.180482  9.341179  90.65882 
    (9.69661)  (9.69661)     (13.2317)  (13.2317) 
 6  0.046604  99.29389  0.706110  6  0.191866  18.83654  81.16346 
    (11.3735)  (11.3735)     (16.5174)  (16.5174) 
 7  0.047582  99.03991  0.960088  7  0.204538  28.50959  71.49041 
    (12.7382)  (12.7382)     (18.9203)  (18.9203) 
 8  0.048094  98.83058  1.169422  8  0.216269  36.03529  63.96471 
    (13.7162)  (13.7162)     (20.4124)  (20.4124) 
 9  0.048333  98.67837  1.321631  9  0.225588  41.08572  58.91428 
    (14.3547)  (14.3547)     (21.3153)  (21.3153) 
 10  0.048428  98.58007  1.419932  10  0.232134  44.16496  55.83504 
    (14.7170)  (14.7170)     (21.8993)  (21.8993) 
Note : Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions) 
Table 7 Variance Decomposition Of Inequality and Burglary  
  
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LI:       
Variance 
Decomposition 
of LB:     
 Period S.E. LB LI  Period S.E. LB Li 
                
                
 1  0.017962  3.541312  96.45869  1  0.090816  100.0000  0.000000 
    (7.49357)  (7.49357)     (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.026962  7.201380  92.79862  2  0.140971  98.73171  1.268292 
    (10.0442)  (10.0442)     (4.03282)  (4.03282) 
 3  0.033661  14.78468  85.21532  3  0.163716  98.07825  1.921754 
    (13.7776)  (13.7776)     (7.08736)  (7.08736) 
 4  0.039426  23.76707  76.23293  4  0.170278  98.10315  1.896850 
    (16.7831)  (16.7831)     (8.83333)  (8.83333) 
 5  0.044196  31.27887  68.72113  5  0.171159  98.00517  1.994827 
    (18.8961)  (18.8961)     (9.66513)  (9.66513) 
 6  0.047670  36.45345  63.54655  6  0.171795  97.34258  2.657423 
    (20.3276)  (20.3276)     (10.7321)  (10.7321) 
 7  0.049855  39.62209  60.37791  7  0.173458  96.33153  3.668465 
    (21.2931)  (21.2931)     (12.0475)  (12.0475) 
 8  0.051025  41.36959  58.63041  8  0.175631  95.37697  4.623027 
    (21.9842)  (21.9842)     (12.9116)  (12.9116) 
 9  0.051543  42.21136  57.78864  9  0.177615  94.69387  5.306126 
    (22.4715)  (22.4715)     (13.2568)  (13.2568) 
 10  0.051718  42.53874  57.46126  10  0.179060  94.29527  5.704731 
    (22.7449)  (22.7449)     (13.3364)  (13.3364) 
Note : Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions) 
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Table 8 Variance Decomposition Of Inequality and Property Crime  
 
  
Variance 
Decomposition of 
LI:       
Variance 
Decomposition of 
LPRO     
 Period S.E. LI LPRO  Period S.E. LI LPRO 
                
                
 1 0.019112 100 0  1 0.087162 1.719255 98.28074 
   0 0    (-5.64565) (-5.64565) 
 2 0.030144 99.9983 0.0017  2 0.136819 3.928723 96.07128 
   (-1.47687) (-1.47687)    (-8.35303) (-8.35303) 
 3 0.03729 99.944 0.055999  3 0.162638 3.315245 96.68475 
   (-3.62136) (-3.62136)    (-9.42812) (-9.42812) 
 4 0.041835 99.76431 0.235691  4 0.174909 3.602059 96.39794 
   (-5.90319) (-5.90319)    (-9.63437) (-9.63437) 
 5 0.04469 99.45556 0.544442  5 0.184035 8.390198 91.6098 
   (-7.89071) (-7.89071)    (-12.225) (-12.225) 
 6 0.046429 99.07582 0.924184  6 0.194757 17.10258 82.89742 
   (-9.50939) (-9.50939)    (-15.7746) (-15.7746) 
 7 0.047428 98.69795 1.302051  7 0.206755 26.34102 73.65898 
   (-10.7367) (-10.7367)    (-18.3252) (-18.3252) 
 8 0.047953 98.37601 1.623988  8 0.218045 33.75676 66.24324 
   (-11.6928) (-11.6928)    (-19.765) (-19.765) 
 9 0.048196 98.13515 1.864852  9 0.227187 38.84587 61.15413 
   (-12.6492) (-12.6492)    (-20.4627) (-20.4627) 
 10 0.048291 97.97589 2.024114  10 0.233738 41.99109 58.00891 
   (-13.6384) (-13.6384)    (-20.7555) (-20.7555) 
                
Note : Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions) 
